Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines:
Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform
Max M. Schanzenbacht & Emerson H. Tillertt
INTRODUCTION

Amid widespread belief that unwarranted sentencing disparity existed in federal criminal sentencing, Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984,' which established the Sentencing Commission
and authorized the creation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.2 The idea of creating guidelines to limit judicial discretion in sentencing was politically popular at the time,' and was prompted by the
belief among policymakers that significant disparities existed in sentences.' The reaction of the federal judiciary was quite the opposite,
with many federal judges objecting to the limitation of their historic
sentencing discretion. Over one hundred district courts struck down
the Sentencing Reform Act on a variety of constitutional grounds!
6
The Supreme Court, however, upheld the Act in 1989.
The calm lasted barely a decade. By 2000, the Court had begun to
whittle away at the constitutionality of the Guidelines, beginning with
the seminal case of Apprendi v New Jersey, and more recently with
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See Stith and Koh, 28 Wake Forest L Rev at 223,258-59 (cited in note 2) (describing the
"growing public concern with crime" and the shift in framing the creation of guidelines as an
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the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 NYU L Rev 1377, 1403, 1435
table 5 (noting that 179 district court judges invalidated the Guidelines on separation of powers,
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United States v Booker,' which made the Guidelines advisory rather
than mandatory (thereby preserving their constitutionality).' While the
effect of this status change appears to be fairly small at present, new
constitutional challenges continue to mount against Guidelines sentencing as the Supreme Court's sentencing jurisprudence remains fluid. In
addition, the federal judiciary and, to a similar degree, the legal academy continue to show hostility to the Sentencing Guidelines.0
This study combines positive political theory with a unique data
set on judges to appraise the effectiveness of the Sentencing Guidelines system. To our knowledge, ours is the first large-scale study on
federal sentencing to match identified judges with offenders. In addition, we propose two reforms that could better accomplish the goals of

8 543 US 220 (2005).
9 See id at 245 (holding that the provision of the federal sentencing statute that makes the
Guidelines mandatory should be excised to preserve the constitutionality of the Guidelines as a
whole); Apprendi, 530 US at 476 (holding that any fact that increases the statutory maximum
sentence for a crime must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
10 The judicial hostility toward the Guidelines is evidenced not only by public statements
of many judges, but also by the fact that the Guidelines appear to have made judges more likely
to retire. See Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions
of Federal Judges?, 33 J Legal Stud 231, 234 (2004). In particular, Boylan found that postGuidelines, judges retired 4.8 months after they became eligible for senior status (essentially
right away), whereas the previous average had been three years after eligibility. See id at 251
(concluding that the findings are consistent with the belief that "judges care about power, not
being overturned, and imposing sentences proportional to the offense"). The differences between pre- and post-Guidelines retirement decisions are quite stark. See id at 245 figure 1 (showing a drastic increase in judges' propensity to take senior status beginning in 1991).
Surveys of judges generally show hostility toward the Guidelines. A survey conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center in 1996 revealed that almost three-quarters of trial judges and over twothirds of appellate judges believed that mandatory federal guidelines are unnecessary. Molly
Treadway Johnson and Scott A. Gilbert, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Results of the Federal
Judicial Center's 1996 Survey 3 (Fed Jud Center 1997). It is possible that the new, post-Guidelines
generation of district court judges is more amenable to them. A later survey did not repeat the
question by the Federal Judicial Center but indicated that opposition might have slackened. See
Michael E. O'Neill, Surveying Article II Judges' Perspectives on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 15 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 215,218 (2003) (showing that approximately 78 percent of judges
reported "higher" or "middle" ratings for the Guidelines' achievements in fnrthering the purposes of sentencing). For example, roughly 50 percent of responding judges thought that "more"
of their sentences were achieving the goals of the Guidelines. Id at 215.
For a judge's defense of the Guidelines, see Honorable Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar
Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective,30 Suffolk
U L Rev 1027,1029-30 (1997) (arguing that the Guidelines promote a more "deliberate, fair, and
rational" sentencing process than the old regime of discretion, and discussing possible disparities
that remain because of substantial-assistance downward departures).
Few academics defend the Guidelines as presently constituted. But see Frank 0. Bowman
III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained,and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines,1996 Wis L Rev 679,748 (arguing that the limitation of "judicial discretion
is ... a beneficial result" of the Guidelines and that an increase in prosecutorial discretion is "no
cause for alarm").
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the Guidelines while maintaining much of their present structure:
(1) open data and (2) ideologically mixed circuit court panels.
The importance of this study is fourfold. First, it unifies theory
with the type of real judge data and empirical testing that most scholars, policymakers, and judges would accept as theoretically and empirically valid. The theory opens up the black box of sentencing procedure and produces reasonable propositions for empirical testing. The
empirical test brings together judge-specific data with actual sentencing
data in a manner that directly tests the propositions from the theory.
The study thereby enriches our understanding of criminal sentencing by
focusing on the microanalytic details of criminal sentencing procedure.
Second, the study is important in how it relates to the Supreme
Court's and circuit courts' evolving sentencing jurisprudence. The effects of recent Supreme Court decisions, including Apprendi and Booker,
are uncertain, and more recent decisions continue to call Guidelines
sentencing into question." Our theory and evidence yield some interesting predictions-namely, that under an "advisory standard," the circuit courts' role in reviewing sentences will become more important.
Third, this Article illustrates why transparency in sentencing
data-in particular, data on the identity of sentencing judges-could
be useful in identifying sources of judicial sentencing disparity that
would inform the types of reform necessary to improve consistency.
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the Sentencing Commission have collected a detailed database on all federal
criminal sentences. But while the criminal sentencing database is generally available to scholars and the public (and we use available sentencing data in this study), the Administrative Office and Sentencing
Commission have adopted a policy prohibiting scholars and the public
access to one of the most important pieces of the data set-the judge
identifiers for each sentence. Without such data, it is costly and difficult for most scholars to identify and measure interjudge disparities
on the scale that we present here. Without such openness, empirical
evaluation and the reform that could follow will likely be slow, incremental, and even misguided.
Finally, this study leads us to suggest a powerful and controversial
reform-the requirement of political-ideological diversity on judicial
panels reviewing criminal sentences, which would ensure hierarchical
political-ideological diversity between the lower sentencing court and
the higher court reviewing such decisions. Specifically, all sentencing
I1 See, for example, Cunningham v California, 127 S Ct 856, 870-71 (2007) (striking down
California's guidelines as incompatible with Booker and Apprendi for authorizing a judge, not a
jury, to find the facts that permitted a higher sentence).
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review should involve both Democratic and Republican judicial appointees. This amounts to an engineering of the political structure of
the judiciary that most scholars, judges, and policymakers would
quickly reject at first mention for practical and jurisprudential reasons.
We argue, nonetheless, that the benefits would be substantial and that
such a proposal (or one that adopts its primary tenet-recognition of
the role that political-ideological diversity within the judiciary can play)
deserves serious consideration.
The rest of this Article is organized as follows. Part I explores the
Sentencing Guidelines and surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on them; Part II presents our empirical results and discusses their
implications for both the broader literature on judicial discretion and
the Sentencing Guidelines; and Part III outlines proposals for reform.
I. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY AND EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP
The Sentencing Act charged the United States Sentencing Commission to develop sentencing guidelines that would "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct."' 2
Pursuant to this legislative directive, the Sentencing Commission developed a sentencing table containing recommended sentencing
ranges for various offense level/criminal history combinations (see
Appendix Figure 1)." With the aid of the probation officer, a district
judge uses the Sentencing Commission's regulations, which rival the
tax code in length, to calculate the defendant's numeric "offense level.""
The crime of conviction sets the "base" offense level; levels are added
or subtracted based on a variety of factors, such as the use of a gun,
the use of sophisticated means in a fraud, whether the crime affected a
financial institution, whether the offender played a major or minor
role in the crime, acceptance of responsibility, and the like.'" The offender's criminal history category is calculated based on the prior of-

28 USC § 991(b)(1)(B).
Post-Booker,this basic structure has survived intact but is no longer "mandatory." See
Booker, 543 US at 259. The post-Booker world is discussed in greater detail below, but because
our data are pre-Booker,we describe the pre-Booker framework.
14 See USSG § 1B1.1-1.3. See also Ilya Beylin, Comment, Booker's Unnoticed Victim: The
Importance of Providing Notice prior to Sua Sponte Non-Guidelines Sentences, 74 U Chi L Rev
961, 967-68 (2007) (describing the probation officer's development of the presentence report
and the role it plays in the calculation of defendant's "offense level").
15 See USSG §§ 2Al.1-3El.1.
12
13
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fenses committed by the offender. 16 These two factors-offense level
and criminal history-yield a sentencing range expressed in months. 7
As can be seen from Appendix Figure 1, the sentencing range counts
for roughly 25 percent of the total sentence imposed." All of these determinations are subject to appellate review.' Pre-Booker,if the offense
level and criminal history were properly calculated, a sentence within
the specified range created a safe harbor for the sentencing judge and
could not be reversed by the higher court. Such protection from reversal is no longer certain in the aftermath of Booker."
The Sentencing Reform Act authorized judges to depart from the
calculated sentencing range if there was an "aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.""
Under the Act, a judge had to justify a departure by making a statement in open court or in a written opinion. 3 The United States could
appeal a downward departure, and the defendant could appeal an up4 In 1994, the Commission
ward departure."
made clear that factors
"not ordinarily" relevant could still be considered in departure decisions if they removed the case from the "heartland" of the Guidelines. The Supreme Court endorsed the "heartland" concept explicitly
in Koon v United States.16 Koon also required appellate courts to review a district court judge's departure from the Guidelines for "abuse
16 See, for example, USSG §§ 4A1.1-1.2, 4B1.1-1.5 (instructing the sentencing judge as to
which prior offenses are appropriate to consider and the proper weight to be accorded to various
offenses and patterns of criminal behavior).
17 See USSG § 5A sentencing table.
18 While the Sentencing Commission ultimately determined the offense levels and criminal
history categories, the Sentencing Reform Act mandated that unless the minimum exceeds thirty
years, sentencing ranges be no more than the greater of 25 percent of the minimum guideline
range or six months. See 28 USC § 994(b)(2).
19 See 18 USC § 3742 (2000) (instituting a clearly erroneous standard of review for factual
findings and an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the district court's application of the
Guidelines to the facts). But see Booker, 543 US at 259 (excising § 3742(e) because this section
was predicated on the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines).
20 See 18 USC § 3742(a)-(b) (allowing appeal only if a sentence is imposed in violation of
the law, is imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines, is greater than the
maximum or below the minimum, or is imposed for an offense for which there is no guideline).
21 See text accompanying note 68-71.
22 18 USC § 3553(b). See also USSG § 5K2.0 policy statement (specifically authorizing
departure when certain Guidelines-identified circumstances are present that were not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission and limiting departure based on other
circumstances to exceptional cases).
23 18 USC § 3553(c).
24 See 18 USC § 3742(a)(3),(b)(3).
25 USSG § 5K2.0 policy statement.
26 518 US 81,98-110(1996).
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of discretion," a substantially less deferential standard than the
"clearly erroneous" standard used for reviewing offense-level adjustments.27 In effect, a lower court was at greater risk of reversal if it used
the more extreme departure mechanism to lengthen or shorten the
sentence imposed on a defendant. After Booker, the standard of review for all sentences is "whether the sentence 'is unreasonable' with
regard to [the Guidelines],"' though, as discussed below, it appears
that departures continue to receive greater scrutiny.
Policymakers expected that the Guidelines, with their specific and
mandatory formulas for calculating prison terms, would harmonize
judicial practices and eliminate unwarranted interjudge disparities in
sentencing. Empirical research since the promulgation of the Guidelines suggests, however, that considerable unwarranted disparity in
federal sentencing remains. Some studies have focused on sentencing
disparity related to characteristics of the criminal defendants. 9 Others
have found that characteristics of judges, such as race, gender, and
political affiliation, also affect sentences." Those studies, however,

27

Id at 97-100.

28
29

See Booker, 543 US at 261.
See, for example, David B. Mustard, Racial,Ethnic, and Gender Disparitiesin Sentencing:

Evidence from the US. Federal Courts,44 J L & Econ 285,311-12 (2001) (finding that black and
male offenders with lower levels of education and income receive longer sentences, primarily as
a result of departures); Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing under the FederalSentencing Guidelines:
Effects of Defendant Characteristics;Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for
Drug Offenses; 1991-1992, 31 L & Socy Rev 789, 817 (1997) (finding disparity in sentencing
related both to offense characteristics and to factors such as the defendant's ethnicity, gender,
education level, and noncitizenship); Douglas C. McDonald and Kenneth E. Carlson, Sentencing
in the Federal Courts: Does Race Matter? The Transition to Sentencing Guidelines,1986-90 178,
194 (DOJ 1993) (finding that racial disparity in sentences continues to exist largely as a result of
legitimate factors, such as differing rates of gun use in robberies and the crack/powdered cocaine
sentencing disparity). Mustard in particular finds that no matter how one cuts the data (looking
at only within-range sentences, departures, drug crimes, and so forth), substantial unexplained
differentials exist between the races and sexes. Substantial disparities exist even within the context
of nonviolent crimes. See generally Max M. Schanzenbach and Michael L. Yaeger, Prison Time,
Fines and FederalWhite-collar Criminals:The Anatomy of a RacialDisparity,96 J Crim L & Crmino1 757 (2006) (finding significant racial disparities in Guidelines sentences for white-collar crimes).
30 A considerable amount of research suggests that judges have different sentencing philosophies. See, for example, John S. Carroll, et al, Sentencing Goals, CasualAttributions,Ideology,
and Personality,52 J Personality & Soc Psych 107,110-17 (1987) (demonstrating how an individual's ideology is reflected in how he or she thinks about the causes of crime and the goas of
sentencing); Brian Forst and Charles Wellford, Punishmentand Sentencing: Developing Sentencing Guidelines Empiricallyfrom Principles of Punishment, 33 Rutgers L Rev 799, 808-11 (1981)
(finding that judges oriented towards utilitarian goals of incapacitation and deterrence gave
sentences that were on average at least ten months longer than judges motivated by other goals);
Shari S. Diamond and Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and Its
Reduction, 43 U Chi L Rev 109, 114 (1975) ("[I]t is reasonable to infer that the judges' differing
sentencing philosophies are a primary cause of the disparity."); Anthony Partridge and William B.
Eldridge, The Second Circuit Sentencing Study: A Report to the Judges of the Second Circuit 36-40
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were greatly hampered by the difficulty in identifying judges for the
vast number of criminal sentencing cases. Studies of the effect of judicial characteristics on sentencing have relied either on state samples"'
(raising issues of generalizability to federal sentencing) or nonspecific
(that is, not judge-identified) variation in judicial characteristics aggregated at the federal district level" (raising issues of accuracy). A
few studies have addressed judicial disparity using coded judge identifiers provided by the Commission," and one study employed a small
sample of judges in two districts." This permitted the study of inter(Jud Center 1974) (finding differences among judges in the hypothetical sentences they would
impose on identical offenders). Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell, and R. Barry Ruback claim that:
"[L]iberals" tend to believe that factors external to the offender are responsible for criminal behavior. Rehabilitation is more of a sentencing goal for these judges, leading to greater
reliance on probation and less concern with retribution. "Conservatives" believe that offenders choose to commit crimes. They are more punishment-oriented and tend to impose
longer prison terms.
Paul J. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell, and R. Barry Ruback, The Effect of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines on Inter-judge Sentencing Disparity,90 J Crim L & Criminol 239,250 (1999).
31 See, for example, Darrell Steffensmeier and Chris Hebert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge's Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 Soc Forces 1163
(1998). In this study of Pennsylvania criminal cases, the authors found that female judges tended
to sentence offenders more severely than male judges, were more likely to incarcerate minorities,
and were less likely to incarcerate women. Three studies on the effect of a judge's race on sentencing have found mixed results. However, they involved small sample sizes and examined state
court judges in one city. Id at 1181-86. Susan Welch, Michael Combs, and John Gruhl concluded,
based on a northeastern city's criminal court outcomes, that black judges' incarceration decisions
were moderately different from their white colleagues' decisions. Susan Welch, Michael Combs,
and John Gruhl, Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 Am J Polit Sci 126, 134 (1988). Two
earlier studies concluded that both white and black judges treated black defendants more
harshly. See Thomas M. Uhlman, RacialJustice: Black Judges and Defendants in an Urban Trial
Court 63-72 (1967); Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges,
22 Am J Polit Sci 884, 889-91 (1978). These district- and city-level studies involved only a few
minority judges. It would be hard to conclude from these studies that there are no judge race
effects whatsoever.
32 See, for example, Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparitiesin Prison Sentences:
The Effect of District-levelJudicial Demographics,34 J Legal Stud 57, 85-90 (2005). Relying on
variation at the district level, Schanzenbach found some evidence that minority and female
judges sentence differently.
33 See, for example, Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 287-89
(cited in note 30) (concluding that the Guidelines slightly decreased interjudge sentence disparities); James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Kate Stith, Measuring Interjudge Sentencing
Disparity:Before and after the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,42 J L & Econ 271,298-99,303-04
(1999) (finding a decrease in interjudge disparities in sentence length after the Guidelines, but
cautioning that the advent of mandatory minimum sentences might have contributed to the
decline). Anderson, Kling, and Stith had coded judge identifiers, so they could look at interjudge
disparity, but could not study judicial characteristics. See id at 287.
34 Chantale LaCasse and A. Abigail Payne measured changes in interjudge disparity by
examining whether plea bargain strategies changed after the Guidelines. Chantale LaCasse and
A. Abigail Payne, FederalSentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow of the Judge?, 42 J L & Econ 245, 247-61 (1999) (using a data set
from the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York to analyze interjudge disparity). The au-
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judge variation in sentencing, but not variation based on judge characteristics such as political party or background. Judges were not identified by name, so background characteristics of judges (such as political
orientation) could not be used to study sentencing behavior.
While the existing studies tell us that "judges matter," few measure how judicial biases are translated through the highly structured
sentencing framework. Part of that neglect can be attributed to the
general absence of theory regarding judicial behavior under the Sentencing Guidelines. There are fairly straightforward conjectures from
political science and other fields that could be tested, such as whether
a judge's political orientation, race, or economic standing influence
her sentencing outcomes. However, these propositions fail to incorporate the complexity of the Sentencing Guidelines or account for the
strategic behavior of judges in accomplishing their sentencing goals.
Theory is a necessary guide here. We need to think critically
about how the institutional structures built into the Guidelines-such
as offense-level adjustments and departures-could be used strategically by judges to attain sentencing outcomes closer to their personal
preferences instead of those outcomes intended by statute and the
Guidelines. Indeed, given the complex formulas for determining
criminal offense levels and the associated presumptive sentencing
ranges from which judges determine prison sentences, empirical tests
of judicial behavior require more nuanced construction to capture the
limitations on and opportunities for judges created by such institutional complexity.
Recent progress on theory-in particular, positive political theory-has made more sophisticated and nuanced empirical scholarship
regarding judicial behavior possible. In a recent article, we considered
how judicial characteristics of judges interacted with the Guidelines'
structure and the political diversity within the judicial hierarchy (that
is, lower court political alignment with higher courts)." To our knowledge, this was the first study to examine how the complexity of the
Sentencing Guidelines affects the strategies judges employ to maximize their sentencing goals. Lacking judge-specific data, that empirical
investigation instead relied on generalized statistical probabilities that
a judge of a particular political persuasion would have heard a given
case based on the proportion of Democratic versus Republican apthors concluded that judge-specific effects on plea bargains actually increased post-Guidelines,
implying that prosecutors and defense attorneys believed that judges mattered as much after the
Guidelines as before. See id at 267-68.
35 See Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging under the US Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J L, Econ, & Org 24, 26 (2006)
(examining the use of departures versus the use of offense-level adjustments in light of the political alignment between the sentencing judge and the reviewing court).
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pointees sitting in a given district. We thus estimated the likelihood
that a particular sentencing outcome was decided by a Democratic or
Republican judicial appointee.16 Under the assumption that cases were
randomly assigned and that each judge sentenced approximately the
same number of offenders, this identification strategy permitted us to
estimate the effect on sentencing of increasing the probability that an
offender was sentenced by a Democratic or Republican appointee.
We found that sentences for serious crimes in districts with more
Democratic appointees were lower on average than in districts with
more Republican appointees." More importantly, we found that the
politics of the circuit court was important in sentencing departures by
lower court judges, but did not influence offense-level adjustments by
those judges. For example, Democratic- and Republican-appointed
district court judges used offense levels to adjust prison sentences to
roughly the same degree (although in opposite directions) whether
they were in majority Democratic- or Republican-appointed circuits.
On the other hand, Democratic appointees in majority Democratic
circuits departed to a degree greater than Democratic appointees in
majority Republican circuits." This result was in line with our theoretical prediction: because departures are reviewed more stringently than
fact-oriented adjustments, the political alignment of the reviewing
court was more important for departures.
That study, however, was limited by the lack of judge-level data to
match sentencing data from the United States Sentencing Commission. The identification strategy, which relied on aggregated information on the general variation of political ideology at the district level,
is open to criticism on several fronts. The first problem with aggregating information without knowing specific judge identifiers for particular sentences is that the district-level case assignment rules (perhaps
imposed by the chief judge) may change as the district's ideology
changes, or judges may use their colleague's sentences as a reference

36 Id at 35-36. We used the political variation within the district to measure the impact of
political ideology on sentencing. We let %DEMOCRAT be the percentage of active judges appointed by a Democratic president on the relevant district bench for the year of the observed
sentence. Id at 36. The higher this percentage, the greater the chance that an individual offender
is sentenced by a Democratic-appointed judge. Id. Provided that assignment is random, the
coefficient on this measure is the same as comparing an all-Democratic-appointed bench to an
all-Republican-appointed one.
37 See id at 39 table 1,40.
38 Id at 52-53. Interestingly, Republican-appointed district judges did not depart upward
more in majority-Republican circuits. Id at 49-50. We suspect several reasons for this, among them
(1) the general high sentences under the Guidelines; (2) the ability to use adjustments to exponentially increase the sentences; and (3) the near-certainty of an appeal of an upward departure.
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point. As such, our previous identification strategy captured some district-level effects apart from changes in individual judge ideologies.
A second criticism is that the aggregated identification strategy is
bound to be "noisy" and this would tend to bias estimated effects toward zero (that is, make the results appear weaker than they actually
are). For example, a newly appointed judge may not impose sentences
for several months after confirmation. If judges become more efficient
over time, they may also sentence more offenders. How to lag the
change without knowing the individual judges who issued the sentences
is therefore unclear. In addition, the strategy is only accurate if Democratic and Republican appointees sentence at similar rates. If Democratic appointees consistently sentence fewer individuals (perhaps because they have more time taken up by trials, or have higher acquittal
rates), then the true district variation will be less substantial than the
relative numbers of Democratic and Republican appointees indicate.
Furthermore, local rules may mean that offenders are not randomly
assigned to judges within a district but instead within a district division.
Finally, most of the variation was in one direction-that is, in the
time frame of our previous study, most of the variation occurred as
districts became more Democratic and less Republican as President
Clinton replaced Bush and Reagan appointees. Contemporaneous
time trends in sentencing could bias estimates of partisan effects in
either direction. Trends could occur, for example, because we do not
adequately control for changes in Guidelines policy toward certain
crimes. We found some evidence, for example, that Democratic appointees were harsher on white-collar crime. However, this result did
not survive when we included time trends for white-collar crimes. If
we could actually match judges to the data, we could make direct comparisons between Republican and Democratic appointees over time.
The next Part summarizes a positive theory of sentencing under
the Guidelines and presents estimates of differences in sentencing
using a data set with judge-specific identities matched to sentenced
offenders. This approach offers some fresh insights into the political
dynamics of criminal sentencing.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY WITH JUDGE-LEVEL DATA

A. Sentencing Framework and Theoretical Predictions
Positive political theories of judging suggest that much of the policy discretion exercised by judges is guided by the judges' policy preferences, constrained by the prospect of higher court review, and accomplished through a variety of legal decision instruments available
to judges when deciding cases. Judges are modeled as strategic policymakers who routinely manipulate doctrines, procedures, and other
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decision instruments to advance their preferred policies when faced
with review by higher courts, which may have competing policy preferences. Positive political theory suggests that lower court judges
choose between fact- and law-based explanations for their decisions
depending on the ideological alignment between the lower court and
the supervising higher court. More specifically, because higher courts
are more likely to review broad-ranging legal conclusions from lower
courts than highly specific fact findings of lower courts, a lower court
may emphasize factual findings in its decision when not politically
aligned with a higher court (thereby ensuring minimal review by the
higher court) and legal conclusions when the higher court is politically
aligned (thereby enjoying the broad policy discretion associated with
having likeminded higher court judges as reviewers).39
The theory described above maps onto the federal criminal sentencing framework remarkably well. First, most scholars and observers
agree that political-ideological preferences are at play when judges
sentence criminals. 0 The conventional wisdom suggests that liberals
(Democratic appointees) prefer more lenient sentences than do conservatives (Republican appointees) for "serious crimes" (violent, theft,
and drug crimes)."
Second, the Sentencing Guidelines provide fact- and law-based instruments to judges for determining a defendant's sentence-instruments
that can be manipulated in setting sentence lengths. As mentioned
above, these fact-oriented determinations relate to aggravating and
mitigating factors set out in the Sentencing Guidelines. If these factors
are found to exist, the sentencing judge can make upward or downward adjustments to the base offense level. While the base offense

39 See Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from
Administrative Law, 31 J Legal Stud 61, 67, 81-82 (2002) (finding that federal appellate judges
strategically employ fact- or law-based reasoning consistent with positive political theory when
deciding administrative law cases); Emerson H. Tiller and Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments:
Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J L, Econ, & Org 349,362 (1999)

("[L]ower court judges are [ ] given toward protecting their decisions from higher court review
through the strategic selection of ...
the legal grounds upon which they make their decisions.").
40 See, for example, Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 250 (cited in
note 30).
41 See, for example, id ("[P]hilosophical differences among judges accounted for a significant portion of the differences in sentences imposed on offenders in the federal courts prior to
enactment of the sentencing guidelines."). We use the phrase "serious crimes" somewhat loosely.
The crimes at issue here are federal crimes, so our criminals are not typical. Most of the crimes have
interstate characteristics. In the time frame of the sample, 43 percent of those sentenced under the
federal Guidelines were sentenced for drug trafficking, over 14 percent were sentenced for fraud,
and 8.5 percent for immigration offenses. The crimes here are also federal in nature. For example,
over 90 percent of the violent crimes in the sample are armed bank robbery and 96 percent of
the "drug crimes" in the sample are for trafficking (less than 3 percent are for possession).
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level is set by the crime of conviction 2 (a determination made prior to
and separate from the sentencing hearing), the Guidelines direct the
sentencing judge in the postconviction proceedings to make modifications to the base offense-level calculation if the judge finds that certain
adjustments or "specific offense characteristics" listed in the Guidelines- essentially, facts constituting aggravating and mitigating circumstances-are present in the case. 3 These adjustments produce a final
offense level that results in a new sentencing range from which the
judge can choose the precise prison term for the defendant. These factoriented adjustments are generally reviewed by the circuit court for
clear error," a legal standard that gives substantial discretion to the sentencing judge's conclusion."5 In other words, any sentence within the
adjusted (or "final") offense level would be relatively free from reversal.
Because adjustments are tied to factual circumstances listed in
the Guidelines, there is a natural limit to the number of adjustments
that can be made and, therefore, limits to the change in the length of
sentence from the base level. To the extent that adjustments are insufficient to maximize the sentencing judge's preferences, judges may
choose the more dramatic law-based alternative to lengthen or
shorten the presumptive sentence-a departure from the Guidelines'
sentencing range altogether." In order to depart, a judge must find
that as a matter of law the circumstances are so unusual that the case
42 As discussed in greater detail below, base offense levels in drug crimes are not set entirely by the crime of conviction, but also by the quantity of drugs involved.
43 See USSG §§ 2A1.1-3El.1. The sentencing judge uses the preponderance of the evidence
standard to make these determinations, a standard considerably below the guilt phase standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt. For a discussion of the scope of the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, see Jonathan E Mitchell, Apprendi's Domain, 2006 S Ct Rev 297, 305 (noting that the
Supreme Court has limited the constitutional proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement to
facts characterized as "elements," those facts that the prosecution must establish to secure a
conviction, as opposed to facts that "affect only a defendant's sentence").
4
See, for example, United States v Rodriguez, 278 F3d 486, 493 (5th Cir 2002) (holding
that a district court's valuation of funds for the purposes of making an adjustment to the offense
level in a money laundering prosecution based on specific offense characteristics is a determination of fact reviewed for clear error).
45 One Fourth Circuit judge characterized it this way: "The clear error standard is not
concerned with the certainty of an appellate court regarding its own view of the facts. Where
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the [sentencing judge'sl choice between them
cannot be clearly erroneous." United States v Riggs, 370 F3d 382, 391 (4th Cir 2004) (Duncan
dissenting) (quotation marks and citations omitted), vacated and remanded as Riggs v United
States, 543 US 1110 (2005).
46 See 18 USC § 3553(b) (outlining grounds for imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines
range). See also USSG § 5K2.0 policy statement (detailing further grounds for departures). In
1994, the Sentencing Commission adopted the position that factors "not ordinarily" relevant can
still be considered if they remove the case from the "heartland" of the Guidelines. See id. The
Supreme Court subsequently endorsed the "heartland" departures concept in Koon, 518 US at
98-110. The Court also held that departures from the Guidelines should be reviewed by circuit
courts for abuse of discretion. See id at 97-100.
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lies outside the "heartland" of the Guidelines. 7 This determination
requires significant legal conclusions about the reach of the Sentencing Guidelines in addition to factual findings. These law-oriented departures allow the district court judge to make significant enhancements or reductions to the calculated sentence because the judge is
not limited to the more rigid boundaries associated with sentencing
ranges determined by adjusted offense levels. The cost of such discretionary power is that a departure invites greater scrutiny from circuit
courts because (1) the circuit courts are especially interested in determinations of law as they may set a legal precedent for future cases,
and (2) the prevailing review doctrine (pre-Booker)-abuse of discretion-calls for a close review of the lower court's law-oriented conclusions." In addition, the Guidelines themselves strongly discourage departures on most grounds, and the legal standard for a departure is
high-the judge must find that the case is sufficiently unusual to be
removed from the "heartland" of the Guidelines. In short, the reversal
risks for the sentencing judge increase if she uses a departure.
An application of positive political theory to federal criminal sentencing suggests that when the lower and higher courts have similar
sentencing preferences, the sentencing judge has the ability to use
both adjustments and departures in a cumulative manner to set the
defendant's sentence to the term most preferred by the sentencing
judge. When the lower and higher courts are not so aligned, however,
the risk of reversal increases, especially for departure (law-based) determinations by the lower court judge. Consequently, one would predict the district court judge to rely less on departures to maximize sentencing preferences under these conditions.
The empirical implications, thus, are as follows: (1) policy preferences matter in sentencing-liberal (Democratic-appointed) judges
give different (generally lower) sentences than conservative (Republican-appointed) judges for certain categories of crime; (2) the length of
the sentence given by sentencing judges depends on the amount of
political-ideological alignment between the sentencing judge and the
circuit court; and (3) sentencing judges selectively use adjustments and
departures to enhance or reduce sentences, and the use of departures is
influenced by the degree of political alignment between the sentencing judge and the overseeing circuit court, while the use of adjustments is not so influenced.

47
48

USSG § 5K2.0 policy statement.
See Koon,518US at97-100.
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Data Sources

Until recent developments in electronic recordkeeping by courts,
access to sentencing decisions posed some challenges. Most decisions
were not published in reporters; the only way to get the information
was to make a trip to the courthouse and collect data by hand. During
the 1990s, the Administrative Office created Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER) in order to make court documents easily accessible to parties and the general public. District participation
varied somewhat over the first few years, but by the late 1990s almost
all districts participated to some degree. PACER is not standardized
across districts, and the types of documents that are available on
PACER vary widely. Some districts merely report the docket sheets,
while others include links to motions, plea agreements, and sentencing
opinions. This information is not generally available on other electronic legal databases such as Westlaw or Lexis.
The Sentencing Reform Act requires the Commission to keep
data on federal criminal sentencing and the Commission has generally
provided substantial information on sentences to the public. From its
inception, however, the Commission has refused to identify the sentencing judge in the data, and Congress recently balked at forcing the
Commission to do so. Congress did require the Commission to release
judge data to Congress when requested, 9 and even this raised a significant uproar among the judiciary. 0
The unavailability of judge data is one of the most frustrating aspects of the study of federal sentencing and has significantly impeded
scholarly evaluation of the Guidelines' efficacy. The question of whether
the Guidelines are serving their intended function of reducing dispar49 See The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act) requires the chief judge of every district to collect information on sentencing, including the stated reasons for downward departures. See Pub L No 108-21
§ 401(h), 117 Stat 650, 672 (2003). This information must be made available to Congress or the
Justice Department when requested. The Attorney General is required to make a report of every
departure it opposes to the Judiciary Committees of both houses, including the name of the sentencing judge and whether an appeal will be made. PROTECT Act § 401(l)(2), 117 Stat at 674-75.
50 Chief Justice Wflliam H. Rehnquist publicly expressed his dismay at the reporting requirements, worrying that the requirements "could appear to be an unwarranted and illconsidered effort to intimidate individual judges in the performance of their judicial duties."
William H. Rehnquist, 2003 Year-end Report on the Federal Judiciary (2003), online at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2003year-endreport.html (visited Apr 16,
2008). See also Letter from William H. Rehnquist, S 151, 108th Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 3, 2003), in
149 Cong Rec S 5120 (Apr 10, 2003) (opposing "any amendment to 28 USC § 994(w) that would
impose specific record keeping and reporting requirements on federal courts in all criminal cases
or that would require the Sentencing Commission to disclose confidential court records to the
Judiciary Committees on request"); Letter from Leonidas R. Mecham, S 151, 108th Cong, 1st
Sess (Apr 2, 2003), in 149 Cong Rec S 5120-21 (Apr 10, 2003) (cautioning Congress to not subject judges to the "risk of unfair criticism" by requiring disclosure of sentencing records).
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ity in sentencing requires the study of how judges behave under the
Guidelines. For this purpose, the identification of judge characteristics
is important for several reasons. First, sentences provide a unique and
easily quantifiable measure of judicial decisionmaking. Instead of
merely coding a "win" or a "loss" for a "conservative" or "liberal" position, studies of sentencing can measure the number of months that a
judge imposes on an offender. Second, the extent to which judicial
ideology or background influences sentencing may provide evidence
of the sources of sentencing disparities. Third, the alignment of preferences between the circuit and district courts is important under the
Sentencing Guidelines. For example, if disparities are largely driven by
political differences, then attempts to cabin judges by providing rigid
guidelines will only be successful if circuit courts can discipline the
district judges to abide by them. Circuit courts will have an incentive
to do so only to the degree that the sentencing preferences of the district court differ from those of the circuit court.
C. Matching and Reliability of the Data
The docket sheets from individual cases (which we accessed
through PACER) provide most of the data we need to match cases
(with the judge's identity known) to the master data from the Sentencing Commission. Docket sheets almost always report three items
of interest: (1) the date of the sentence; (2) the length of the sentence;
and (3) the sentencing judge. In addition, the docket sheets often record the amount of fine imposed and the general category of crime
(for example, fraud or drug trafficking). The Guidelines data include
the date, district, and length of sentence as well as the amount of fine
and the category of crime. In the vast majority of districts, only a few
sentences are imposed every day. Even in very large districts, there are
only a few sentences within a given crime category per day, so the
docket sheet information enables us to match data-including the
identity of the sentencing judge-in a fairly straightforward manner.
The matches were performed by matching date and length of sentencing, and, when multiple observations or differing sentences were encountered, we relied on type of offense and amount of fine. The offender's Hispanic ethnicity, when identifiable from the docket sheet,
was also used for identification and verification purposes. Cases were
matched from eighty-two district courts out of the ninety-four districts
in the country. For the most part, districts left out of the sample were
those that adopted the PACER system late or did not regularly include docket sheets in their electronic files.
Searching the PACER records was not a straightforward process.
PACER does not permit a search by anything other than party name and
filing date under two broad categories: civil and criminal. We searched
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twenty randomly chosen dates from the 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and
2001-2002 judicial terms under the "criminal" category and put in
"U.S.," ''United States," ''U.S.A.," and "United States of America" as
the party name (the party name is a required field). Records returned
were often dismissals, transfers, or motions that would not have resulted in a sentence. A number were also proceedings before magistrate judges who, as a general matter, do not impose sentences. We
eliminated these cases, for a total of 2,815 "matchable" cases, of which
2,265 were successfully matched to sentences reported in the Guidelines data. Only 3 percent of the total matchable cases were not
matched due to multiple similar sentences that could not be narrowed
down by using fines or offender characteristics, and these were generally immigration cases. Another 14 percent were not matched because
no sentence and no offender data reported in the master Sentencing
Commission data looked similar to information from the docket. This
is likely the result either of cases that were not reported to the Sentencing Commission or of errors in the docket sheet or Guidelines
data that prevented a successful match. In our view, this represents a
fairly high rate of missing data. As far as we know, this is the only attempt to verify the Commission's data.
We coded whether the judge was appointed by a Republican
president or a Democratic president. We failed to find any significant
partisan effects for white-collar crimes.5 We therefore limited our
sample to serious crimes, the majority of which were drug trafficking
offenses.52 The table below presents summary statistics on relevant
variables in both the matched and the master data.

51 This may be because there are no partisan differences and trends toward harsher whitecollar sentencing simply biased our results. The weak white-collar results in the prison sentence
regressions may also be due to smaller sample sizes and lower jail sentences for white-collar
crimes (making it harder to detect any differences). For example, the average sentence for a
white-collar crime was just over 9 months, with an average base offense level of 6.4. In contrast,
the average sentence for drug crimes was 70.2 months, with an average base offense level of
28.46. It is particularly hard to detect changes in prison terms in the case of crimes with very low
base offense levels because changes to these levels cause little change to the actual number of
months in the sentencing range. For example, a decrease of two levels for a drug crime with a
base offense level of twenty-eight reduces the minimum sentence by fifteen months. By comparison, in the case of the average white-collar crime with a base level of six, a change of two levels
(up or down) does not change the actual sentencing range at all. We therefore draw no conclusions concerning the presence or absence of a partisan effect on white-collar crime.
52 The "serious offenses" (number of offenses in parentheses) were: murder (1); manslaughter (2); kidnapping/hostage taking (1); sexual abuse (7); assault (11); bank robbery (83);
arson (3); drug trafficking (899); drugs: communication facilities (18); drugs: simple possession
(9); firearms (215); and auto theft (16).
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TABLE 1
VARIABLES OF INTEREST (SERIOUS CRIMES ONLY)
Matched data

Master data

70.8
(70.86)
23.0
(7.61)
73%

66.5
(70.3)
22.8
(8.04)
75%

32.3
(16.4)
10.1%
41.7%
27.8%

32.5
(9.92)
11.6%
33.5%
36.2%

1.7%
7.9%
6.1%
9.6%
17.1%
8.5%
3.9%
11.5%
10.3%
3.6%
18.5%
1.0%
1,265

3.1%
7.3%
4.4%
10.3%
19.6%
7.6%
4.5%
7.6%
17.7%
5.7%
11.4%
0.6%
-63,000**

Offender variables
Total prison (months)*
Final offense level
Drug trafficking
Age
Female
Black
Hispanic
Circuit breakdown
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
DC Circuit
Sample size
* only prison sentences between 0 and 989 months included.

sample sizes vary slightly based on missing values.

Our sampling procedure requires us to rely on randomly chosen
filing dates. There may be some concern that sampling based on dates
will not yield a random sample. However, we sampled filing dates, not
sentencing dates. Therefore, there is less concern about certain types
of sentences or difficult cases being decided late or early in the week.
As can be seen, the comparison of sample means and percentages in
Table 1 strongly indicates that the sample was drawn randomly. One
anomaly worth mentioning is the disparity between proportions of
black and Hispanic convicts between the Sentencing Commission data
set and our sample. This disparity appears to be largely driven by the
fact that the Eleventh Circuit was oversampled relative to the Ninth; if
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not for the oversampling, the Ninth Circuit would have included relatively more Hispanics. We suspect this difference was due to different
rates of PACER adoption and completeness of records between circuits.
The most important measure of randomness is whether sentencing judges were randomly sampled. During the three judicial terms of
the sample, 50 percent of active district court judges were appointed
by Democratic presidents, and 49 percent of offenders in the matched
data were sentenced by Democratic appointees. There were 389
judges in the sample (the federal district bench had around 1,000 active judges during each year of the sample). 3 Therefore, we have
roughly one-third of the judiciary represented in the sample. In sum,
we have a high degree of confidence that the data are representative
and randomly drawn.
D.

The Results

Tables 2 and 3 below present a basic summary of the empirical
results. The coefficients in Table 2 are the average sentence or offense
level of Democratic-appointed judges relative to Republican-appointed
judges. Table 3 divides district court Democratic-appointed judges into
"aligned" (circuit majority Democratic) and "unaligned" (circuit majority Republican) categories. The Appendix contains a detailed discussion of the results and also presents a more flexible specification
for circuit level politics. In general, we remove from the analysis substantial-assistance departures, which are given for cooperation and
generally controlled by the prosecution.
The outcome variables of interest are change in offense level (final offense level minus base offense level), prison sentence, change in
prison sentence from base offense level, and change in prison sentence
from final offense level. We run a very basic regression in the first instance, with no control variables except a dummy variable that equals
one if the district judge was appointed by a Democrat. This is identical
to testing the difference in means. We next include a set of controls
including basic demographic variables, grid controls for criminal history and base offense level, and circuit dummies. (See the Appendix
for a fuller explanation.) Thus, we can make comparisons between a
raw difference between Democratic and Republican appointees (the
first column) and the difference after we control for a variety of characteristics. The Appendix reports further specifications, which in general suggest that the results are surprisingly robust.

53 Some judges were observed multiple times, which is inevitable given that many cases
have codefendants. As a result, we cluster the data by judge last name.

733

Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines

2008]

TABLE 2
DEMOCRATIC JUDGE EFFECTS
Change in Change in
offense
offense
level
level
(2)
(1)
Democrat
Offender
controls
Circuit
dumie
dummies

Prison
sentence
(3)

Prison
sentence
(4)

Base
change
(5)

Base
change
(6)

Final
change
(7)

Final
change
(8)

-0.72*
(0.34)
No

-0.31
(0.21)
Yes

-6.54
(6.40)
No

-6.65*
(3.12)
Yes

-8.07+
(4.49)
No

-7.22*
(3.40)
Yes

-6.88**
(2.44)
No

-6.02**
(2.27)
Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Grid
crol
controls

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Sample

All

All

No
Sub Asst

No
Sub Asst

No
Sub Asst

No
Sub Asst

NonNondepartures departures

R-squared

0.01

0.33

0.01

0.63

0.01

0.33

0.01

0.21

Observations

1,241

1,225

936

889

762

732

936

887

Regressions are ordinary least squares. Standard errors are robust and reflect clustering by judge.
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; **significant at 1 percent.

TABLE 3
DEMOCRATIC JUDGE AND CIRCUIT EFFECTS

Change in
offense level
(1)

Prison
sentence
(2)

Base
change
(3)

Final
change
(4)

Downward
departure
(5)

Aligned
Democrat

-0.44
(0.31)

-7.76
(5.29)

-5.49
(6.19)

-8.50**
(3.02)

0.089*
(0.044)

Unaligned
Democrat
Offender
controls
Circuit
dummies

-0.20
(0.28)

-5.75
(3.16)

-8.32**
(3.88)

-4.03+
(2.65)

-0.022
(0.033)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

crol

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Cases

All

No
Sub Asst

Nondepartures

No
Sub Asst

No
Sub Asst

0.33
1,225

0.63
889

0.27
732

0.21
887

N/A
899

Grid
controls

R-squared
Observations

Standard errors are robust and reflect clustering by judge.
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.
The "downward departure" column is a probit model in which the dependent variable equals one in the event
of a judge-induced downward departure. Marginal effects reported (so the probability of receiving a downward departure is almost 9 percentage points greater when a Democrat is in a Democratic circuit versus a
Republican or unaligned Democrat).
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Table 2 reveals consistent differences between Democratic and
Republican appointees. The first two columns examine the change in
offense level from the base offense level. The raw difference between
Democratic and Republican appointees is on average -0.72 offense
levels and is significant at the 5 percent level. When controls are
added in Column (2), this difference drops to -0.31 and is not statistically significant. While these differences may not appear to be large at
first, they can translate into large differences in prison sentences. For
example, at an offense level of twenty-three (our sample average),
reducing the offense level by one unit reduces the minimum prison
sentence by five months, and similarly the maximum sentence can be
increased by five months by increasing the offense level by one unit.
At higher offense levels, the difference made by a single adjustment
can be as much as two years. The effect of partisan affiliation on average prison sentences reported in Columns (3) and (4) suggests roughly
6.5-month-lower sentences on average if the offender is sentenced by
a Democratic instead of a Republican appointee. In light of the differences in offense-level calculations, this appears to be a reasonable estimate. The coefficient suggests a nearly 10 percent difference given
the average sentence of seventy months.
Columns (5) and (6) test partisan differences in the "base change,"
or the change in prison sentences from the lowest possible sentence
given the base offense level. Again, the average Democratic appointee
sentences seven or eight months lower than the average Republican
appointee. These changes come solely from changes to the base offense level and differences in sentencing within the Guidelines' sentencing range. Columns (7) and (8) test partisan differences in the "final change," or the change in prison sentences from the lowest possible final calculated range. The results again demonstrate consistent
partisan differences of a magnitude similar to that estimated in Columns (3) and (4).
In sum, the results of Table 2 strongly suggest that there are consistent partisan differences in sentencing, and these differences are
expressed both in terms of offense-level adjustments and departures.
The strongest evidence of differences comes when we consider
changes in prison sentences from "base" or "final" calculated sentencing ranges. Of course, there are situations in which the judge has little
role to play in calculating the offense level and no opportunity to depart; for example, when there are no facts in dispute about the use of a
gun or the quantity of drugs and nothing unique about the offender
that would warrant a departure. Most observers agree, however, that

2008]

Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines

the sentencing hearing can play an important role, and does so when
facts are in dispute.-" Indeed, some justices on the Supreme Court have
recently expressed uneasiness with regard to the Guidehnes over the
influence that judicial factfinding may have on sentencing."
Table 3 tests for circuit alignment effects by dividing Democratic
appointees into "aligned" or "unaligned" circuits. For the most part,
the difference between the aligned and unaligned Democratic appointees is not statistically significant. 6 This is not surprising given the
sample size. However, the coefficients are suggestive and generally
consistent with our hypotheses. First, taking the coefficients as given,
prison sentences (Column (2)) are two months shorter in aligned Democratic circuits. However, when we measure the difference in
changes from the base offense level in Column (3), sentences are actually shorter in unaligned circuits. This is counterbalanced by the
magnitude of departures (Column (4)) and the probability of departures (Column (5)). These are much higher in aligned circuits. Indeed,
the probabilityof a Democraticappointee grantinga departureis statistically significantly higher in aligned circuits than in unaligned circuits.
By contrast, in both probability and magnitude of departure, Democratic-appointed district court judges in Republican circuits are statistically indistinguishable from Republican-appointed district court judges.
Contrasted with Column (3), the departure results in Columns (4)
and (5) are consistent with the idea that departures by Democratic
appointees are easier to make under Democratic circuits. Therefore,
Democratic appointees will rely more on adjustments in Republican
circuits, and will make more use of departures in Democratic circuits.
Thus, there is some evidence of substitution between adjustments and
departures based on circuit court alignment.
This analysis is the first to use the actual party of the sentencing
judge at the federal level to estimate sentencing effects. The results
compare very closely to prior studies using cruder measures but
greater sample sizes. In addition, we are able to identify the plausible
impact of circuit review. Moreover, the results are entirely in line with
54 See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas,110 Yale L J 1097,1152-67 (2001) (criticizing Apprendi on the grounds that it limits the
ability of defendants who plead guilty to contest disputed enhancements at a sentencing hearing).
55 See, for example, Rita v United States, 127 S Ct 2456, 2485 (2007) (Souter dissenting)
(expressing concern over empowering judges "to find the facts necessary to sentence in the
higher range" because doing so "would make the jury a mere gatekeeper to the more important
trial before a judge alone").
56 We admit that simply dividing circuits into "aligned" and "unaligned" categories is a bit
crude. In the Appendix, we extend the analysis and estimate these differences based on the
percentage of the active circuit judges that are Democratic appointees, and we find results consistent with the cruder estimates presented here.
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the theory. Republican and Democratic appointees sentence differently, and circuit court review clearly constrains their decisionmaking.
Democratic appointees rely more on adjustments in Republican circuits, but make greater use of departures when they are aligned with
the reviewing court. The Appendix details that the results are surprisingly robust to alternate empirical specifications.
III. IMPLICATIONS

A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Apprendi, Booker, and the Slow
Unraveling of the Sentencing Guidelines
In Apprendi, decided in 2000, a deeply divided Court invalidated
a New Jersey statute that allowed judges, at the sentencing phase, to
make factual findings that would increase the sentence in excess of the
statutory maximum." Specifically, the Court held that due process and
the Sixth Amendment jury right require that any fact (except that of
prior conviction) that increases the sentence beyond the statutory
maximum must be decided by a jury and proven "beyond a reasonable
doubt."5 At the time, Justice O'Connor noted in dissent that the opinion represented a "watershed" event in constitutional law and hinted
that the Guidelines regime created by Congress could be threatened. 9
After all, Apprendi's reasoning could apply to the Guidelines' sentencing ranges, requiring that the facts necessary for upward adjustments be proven to a jury.
Justice O'Connor's prediction was almost borne out a few years
later. In Blakely v Washington," the Supreme Court applied the reasoning of Apprendi to invalidate the state of Washington's sentencing
guidelines, holding that they violated due process and the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a right to a trial by jury.62 Again, dissenters,
including O'Connor, predicted dire consequences for the federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the Court was widely expected to strike them
down at the next opportunity.? However, in Booker, Justice Breyer, a
57 See 530 US at 497 (holding that the New Jersey statute represents "is an unacceptable
departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system").
58 See id at 490. The Court thereby invalidated a New Jersey hate crime statute that authorized an increase beyond the maximum sentence based solely on a judge's finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with the purpose to intimidate on the basis
of particular characteristics of the victim. See id at 491,497.
59 See id at 524,544 (O'Connor dissenting).
60 See id at 543-44.
61 542 US 296 (2004).
62 See id at 301-08.
63 See id at 323-26 (O'Connor dissenting) ("If the Washington scheme does not comport
with the Constitution, it is hard to imagine a guidelines scheme that would.").
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leading proponent of Guidelines sentencing, crafted a majority opinion that simply excised the portion of the Sentencing Reform Act that
made the Guidelines mandatory, thus preserving the Guidelines' general framework.6' He did so by winning over Justice Ginsburg from the
Blakely majority. As long as the Guidelines are simply advisory, the
remedial opinion in Booker holds, they do not violate the right to a
trial by jury or the right to have elements of a crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. In our view, the key element of the Booker opinion is not that it made the Guidelines advisory, but rather that circuit
courts would now review district court sentences for "reasonableness"
in light of the Guidelines."
What this new standard of review actually means, and what it
means to have nonbinding, advisory Guidelines, was left to the courts
of appeals. The opinion itself provided almost no guidance and did not
choose to define what "reasonableness" review would entail, likely out
of necessity given the 5-4 majority.7
One key question-now only partially answered-is the extent to
which Guidelines sentences still represent safe harbors. In Rita v United
States, the Supreme Court declined to clarify the Booker review
standards further." It held that circuit courts may provide a presumption of validity to a within-Guidelines sentence, but that this presumption still entails a "reasonableness" review.0 The full effect of this reasoning is obviously far from clear because the majority opinion declined to provide clear guidelines on how "reasonableness" would be
evaluated in light of the presumption. In addition, it is not clear from
the opinion when courts can disregard the presumption."

64 See 543 US at 245-46.
65

See id at 245-46 (stating that the Court's approach would make the Guidelines constitu-

tional "while maintaining a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender's

real conduct," and thus preserving Congress's goal of promoting uniformity in sentencing).
66
67

See id at 261.
However, the opinion did note that "reasonableness" had been the standard of review

for departures from the Guidelines prior to a congressional amendment in2003. See id.
68
69
70
71

127 S Ct 2456 (2007).
See id at 2465.
See id at 2464.
It is also important to note that Rita was a 6-3 opinion, and two of the justices in the

majority (Justices Stevens and Ginsburg) had previously voted to declare the Guidelines unconstitutional on Sixth Amendment grounds. See Booker, 543 US at 232-33. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion tried to clarify reasonableness review and stated that it should be meaningful, see Rita,
127 S Ct at 2471-74, while the majority seemed to indicate that due deference would still apply to

the district court's application of the Guidelines, compare id at 2463 ("[T]he presumption reflects
the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review,
both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclu-

sion as to the proper sentence in the particular case.").
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However, it was clear that, post-Booker,judges must still conduct
a sentencing hearing, calculate an offense level, and justify a departure." But how should circuits review within-Guidelines sentences?
Over half of the circuits have held that sentences within a properly
calculated Guidelines range are presumptively reasonable.73 Other
circuits generally accord substantial weight to the Guidelines, but have
made it clear that they do not consider them presumptively reasonable.4 In practice, it is not clear that this split has made any difference.
So far, only one sentence within the Guidelines range has been reversed by an appeals court, and it was reversed not on the grounds
that it was unreasonable, but on the grounds that the district court did
not adequately consider a number of factors." Of course, Rita is a recent decision and we lack even anecdotal evidence of its impact at this
point. However, based on the circuit courts' approach to Booker, and
given that Rita largely validated this approach, it appears that the
Guidelines ranges remain safe harbors as a matter of fact if not law.
Given that the Guidelines still represent safe harbors (or something close to it) as a matter of fact if not law, our prior analysis predicts that little would change post-Booker. District courts can protect
themselves by properly calculating the offense level, and the reviewing circuit court can reverse departures as unreasonable instead of
being an abuse of discretion. This prediction is largely borne out by
the preliminary sentencing data. The United States Sentencing Commission has been closely following post-Booker developments and has
released a thorough analysis of the data on sentencing under the new

72 For example, Justice Breyer was careful to note that judges must consider the Sentencing Guidelines range and continue to make fact findings in light of the Guidelines, conduct a
sentencing hearing, and justify departures. See Booker, 543 US at 259-60,264.
73 See United States v Green, 436 F3d 449, 457 (4th Cir 2006); United States v Alonzo, 435
F3d 551, 554 (5th Cir 2006); United States v Williams, 436 F3d 706, 708 (6th Cir 2006); United
States v Mykytiuk, 415 F3d 606, 608 (7th Cir 2005); United States v Tobacco, 428 F3d 1148, 1151

(8th Cir 2005); United States v Kristl, 437 F3d 1050,1054 (10th Cir 2006). Compare United States
v Cooper, 437 F3d 324, 332 (3d Cir 2006) (rejecting the rebuttable presumption approach but
holding that a sentence within the Guidelines range is "more likely to be reasonable than one
outside the guidelines range"); United States v Talley, 431 F3d 784, 788 (11th Cir 2005) ("lWlhen
the district court imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range, we ordinarily will
expect that choice to be a reasonable one.").
74 See United States v Cantrell,433 F3d 1269, 1279 (9th Cir 2006); United States v Crosby,
397 F3d 103,114-16 (2d Cir 2005) (declining to declare the Guidelines presumptively reasonable,
and identifying a number of errors that could render a sentence within the Guidelines range
unreasonable).
75 United States v Lazenby, 439 F3d 928, 933-34 (8th Cir 2006) (holding that the district
court should have considered a downward departure in light of the defendant's cooperation with
the investigation). The court also reversed the below-Guidelines sentence of a co-conspirator as
unreasonable, suggesting that the conduct was similar and so the sentences should be as well. The
court did not suggest that a lower sentence was the only reasonable course. See id at 932-33.
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system. Although the data following Booker is preliminary, it appears,
not surprisingly, that judge-induced downward departures have increased by about 4 percentage points (from 8.6 percent to 12.5 percent
of all sentences).1 While not earth-shattering, it does represent a
nearly 50 percent increase in the probability of a judge-induced departure. The rate of upward departures doubled, from 0.8 to 1.6 percent.
However, the sentence length" and probability of imprisonment increased only slightly.78 Thus, the most important aspect of sentencing,
the length of the sentence, changed very little. This is largely because,
even though they were more frequent, the average size of departures
remained the about same. 9 This conforms to the general predictions of
our theory and the conclusion of most observers that the fundamen0
tals of sentencing changed little post-Booker."
Some have expressed surprise that, given the widely noted judicial hostility to the Guidelines, the creation of an advisory system
would change so little.' Part of this is surely due to Justice Breyer's
deft handling of the remedial opinion, which largely maintained the
sentencing procedures of the Guidelines and preserved appellate
court review." We acknowledge that it is entirely possible that sentences did not change post-Booker because Booker did not actually
expand the discretion of the district courts, which was probably Justice
Breyer's goal. But why the increase in departures? A likely answer,
consistent with our theory, is that district courts now find it easier, as a
matter of doctrine, to depart from the Guidelines, so they use departures relatively more than they did pre-Booker.They may nonetheless
arrive at substantially the same sentence because the circuit court acts
as the relevant constraint.

76 The effect of Booker depends very much on the relevant comparison period. The
PROTECT Act was effective in the year and a half prior to Booker, and it restricted the use of
downward departures and encouraged prosecutors to appeal them more often. The Sentencing
Commission's statistics indicate that in the seven months prior to the PROTECT Act, the average judge-induced downward departure rate was 8.6 percent. This fell to 5.5 percent during the
PROTECT Act's period of applicability, but increased to 12.5 percent in the year following the
Booker decision. United States Sentencing Commission, Final Report on the Impact of United
States v. Booker on FederalSentencing appendix E-1 (2006).

77

Id at 46.

Id.
Idat 63.
80 For a discussion of how sentencing has played out after Booker, see Douglas A. Berman,
Tweaking Booker:Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 Houston L Rev 341,347-55 (2006)
("Based on a year of experience with the Booker remedy ... it now appears that Justice Breyer
largely succeeded in preserving the fundamental pre-Booker features of federal sentencing."). See
generally Nancy J.King, Reasonableness Review after Booker, 43 Houston L Rev 325 (2006).
81 See Berman, 43 Houston L Rev at 347-58 (cited in note 80).
82 See note 72.
78
79
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We are more hesitant than most other observers, however, to
conclude that nothing meaningfully changed after Booker.The theory
and empirical evidence presented here leave open the possibility that
sentences in fact did change post-Booker, but such changes are
masked by the interplay between district and circuit courts. It is not
clear whether "reasonableness" review is stricter or less strict than the
"abuse of discretion" review that prevailed before. Indeed, reasonableness may suggest a broader role for the circuit courts. If this is the
case, then after Booker sentences will more closely match the preferences of the circuit than before. While sentences may have stayed the
same or even increased in some circuits, they may have decreased in
others. In addition, the changes in sentences are most likely to be apparent only for certain crimes for which long sentences are controversial, such as drug trafficking.
A second possibility is that changes only occurred in circuits that
wished to transfer more discretion to the district courts. It is not surprising that the more conservative circuits (for example, the Fourth,
Fifth, and Seventh) decided to declare the generally high Guidelines
sentences presumptively reasonable,83 while the more liberal Second
and Ninth declined to do so." Thus, the presumptively reasonable circuits encourage Guidelines sentences while maintaining the ability of
an appeals panel to reverse a departure as unreasonable. District judges
in the Second and Ninth Circuits, however, are relatively more free
from the Guidelines' strictures, knowing that the reviewing court favors lower sentences and has signaled its intent to be lenient. If most
judges wish to reduce sentences, then the preferences of the circuit are
met. In addition, these circuits retain the ability to reduce long sentences as unreasonable.
In sum, the evidence on judicial preferences pre-Booker suggests
that we cannot say much about how sentences have changed after
Booker without (1) identifying categories of crime in which judges
have strong sentencing preferences; (2) considering the preferences of
the district judges and the reviewing circuits; and (3) accounting for
how each circuit has interpreted reasonableness review and the weight
each accords to the Guidelines in determining reasonableness.
B.

Transparency Reform

The unavailability of judge-identifying data in criminal sentencing is one of the most frustrating aspects of the study of federal sentencing and has significantly impeded scholarly evaluation of the
83

84

See Green, 436 F3d at 457; Alonzo, 435 F3d at 554; Mykytiuk, 415 F3d at 608.
See Cantrell,433 F3d at 1279; Crosby, 397 F3d at 114-16.
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Guidelines' efficacy. The Sentencing Commission's policy of concealing in its sentencing database the identity of judges and the sentences
they impose in individual cases raises the suspicion that sentencing
bias and sentencing disparity are related and that judges are being
protected from public and academic scrutiny in imposing sentences.
Determining whether the Guidelines are serving their intended function of reducing disparity in sentencing requires the study of how
judges behave under the Guidelines.
The empirical test above illustrates the importance of transparency for identifying bias in criminal sentencing. We suspect that if such
transparency was the norm rather than the exception, it would ultimately translate into less bias as judges become more aware of their
own tendencies and realize the power of empirical scholarship in exposing inconsistencies in sentencing.
In 1986, the Sentencing Commission requested baseline sentencing data from the Administrative Office, including judge identifiers.
The Administrative Office initially supplied the data absent information that would identify the judge that issued a sentence in any specific case. Only later, under an agreement that prevented the public
release of any individual's name associated with the sentencing decision, did the Administrative Office provide the Sentencing Commission with judge identifiers." But scholars and the public were not given
access because of stated concerns for defendant privacy. Professor
Marc Miller has argued that the agreement between the Administrative Office and the Sentencing Commission is "inconsistent with the
spirit and purpose of the Congressional mandates to the Commission
to collect and release information ...[and] obfuscates the decision to
withhold judge identifiers behind an apparent (but logically distinct)
concern for defendant privacy." We agree.
The public availability of judge identifiers would allow scholars to
check judicial discretion in criminal sentencing. In particular, judge
identifiers would allow scholars to evaluate whether, and how much,
85 Judge identifiers remained secret until Congress enacted the PROTECT Act, which,
among other things, made judge identifiers available to the Department of Justice and Congress.
See PROTECT Act § 401(h), 117 Stat at 672. See also Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutorsas Sentencers, 56 Stan L Rev 1211, 1245-47 (2004) (describing the information
dissemination requirements of the PROTECT Act).
86 Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information
Systems, Transparency,and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 Colum L Rev 1351,1356-57 n 19
(2005) (arguing in favor of sentencing information systems that would increase the access of the
public to sentencing data). The agreement states that "[n]o information that will identify an
individual defendant or other person identified in the sentencing information will be disclosed to
persons or entities outside of the Commission without the express permission of the court for
which the information was prepared." United States Sentencing Commission, Public Access to
Sentencing Commission Documents and Data, 54 Fed Reg 51279,51282 (1989).
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judges engage in sentencing disparity under the Sentencing Guidelines, and whether such disparities relate to political and ideological
orientation, other demographics of the judiciary, or the characteristics
of the defendant.87 There is considerable literature linking political
ideology to decision outcomes, and there is little reason to think that
criminal sentencing would escape such bias. Given the establishment
of the Sentencing Commission and the imposition of the Sentencing
Guidelines, making judge identifiers available would help to answer
questions about the success or failure of such institutional reforms.u
At least one judge has called for transparency, arguing that making data available to academic researchers would provide for a better
understanding of the operation of the Sentencing Guidelines. According to Judge Avern Cohn of the Eastern District of Michigan,
[T]here are variations in the "sentencing persona" of district
judges. Experience under the Civil Justice Reform Act using
judge identifiers ... resulted in substantial improvement in shortening the time that judges take to dispose of motions and cases.
Thus far, similar data on individual judges have not been made
available as to guideline sentences out of deference to the perceived sensitivity of judges. The Commission collects these data
under its statutory powers and there is no good reason to continue to maintain the data in secret. A policy of full disclosure is
in the public interest.89
Judge Cohn points out that the Commission likely overrates the
extent to which district judges are opposed to publishing judge identifiers. He notes that an informal poll of judges in the Eastern and
Western Districts of Michigan showed a more than two-to-one vote in
favor of publication. The judges opposing the identifiers were con87 See Miller, 105 Colum L Rev at 1385 (cited in note 86) ("The identification of the individual judge is essential to evaluate the most basic justification for modern sentencing reform:
that individual judges may introduce their own biases across cases or in individual cases.").
88 See Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Reform "Reform" through Sentencing Information Systems, in Michael Tonry, ed, The Future of Imprisonment 121, 146-48 (Oxford 2004) (proposing
that "wide availability of sentencing data including judge identifiers and detailed offense and
offender information" will improve transparency in sentencing). See also Mark H. Bergstrom
and Joseph S. Mistick, The Pennsylvania Experience: Public Release of Judge-specific Sentencing
Data, 16 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 57, 63 (2003) (describing with general approval Pennsylvania's
experience with public release of judge-specific sentencing data and concluding that "[mlany of
the negative outcomes predicted during the development of the policy have not materialized");
Paul J. Hofer and William P. Adams, Using Data for Policymaking,Litigation,and Judging,16 Fed
Sent Rptr (Vera) 8, 11-12 (2003) (describing the current methods used to identify individual
judges and weighing whether it would be good policy to have "full public release of judgeidentifying sentencing data").
89 Avern Cohn, Advice to the Commission -A Sentencer's View, 8 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 14,
14 (1995).
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cerned about "the harm to collegiality that might be occasioned by
such information; its lack of usefulness and possible misuse; and because decisions in sentencing are too fact specific to make such information of value."' While we cannot address the harm to collegiality,
the empirical study provided here suggests that judge identifiers are
very useful in identifying systematic bias attached to ideology and that
the aggregation of information makes it especially valuable compared
to an individual case approach.
C.

Political-institutional Reform

An important conclusion from this Article is that doctrine and
appellate review matter in sentencing. Sentencing judges are constrained from the excessive use of departures by circuit court review,
and the excessive use of adjustments is less constrained. In our view,
political alignment essentially relaxes the doctrinal and jurisprudential
constraints judges face when they want to depart from the Guidelines.
Democratic appointees can depart more when in Democraticdominated circuits. Republican appointees have a similar freedom in
Republican-dominated circuits, although they are less willing to depart than Democratic appointees based on the makeup of the overseeing circuit. This reluctance of Republican appointees is entirely
consistent with the structure of the Guidelines, as (1) Guidelines sentences are generally high already and (2) most adjustments, which are
difficult to review regardless of the circuit court's political makeup,
are (compared to departures) sentence-increasing. Of course, upward
departures being rarer events, it is possible that we simply do not have
a large enough sample size to detect differences for Republican appointees along these lines.
Nonetheless, an extension of this basic insight is that the lack of
judicial political diversity in any given sentencing event increases the
likelihood of greater disparity in sentencing. The current practice of
randomly assigning circuit judges to panels often produces ideologically unbalanced panels with either three Democratic or three Republican appointees controlling the outcome (horizontal political alignment). When such unified panels review a lower court judge who holds
the same political orientation as the panel (vertical political alignment),
there appears to be little check on the severity or leniency of the sentence. Consequently, district court judges sitting under circuits that have
a strong tendency towards ideological alignment (such as a Republicanappointed district court judge sitting within the Fifth Circuit Court of
90 Avem Cohn, The Sentencing Commission's 1993 Annual Report, 7 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera)
137,138 (1994).
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Appeals, which is made up of eleven Republican appointees and four
Democratic appointees) likely feel little vertical constraint in choosing
the severity or leniency of the sentence imposed on defendants.
Other scholarship has demonstrated that the political structure of
the judicial hierarchy, as well as horizontal relationships within a court,
can have profound effects on the consistency of application of legal
doctrines to similarly situated cases. Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller
have shown that a politically diverse panel of judges is more likely to
ensure obedience to established legal doctrine than a panel made up of
judges from the same political orientation.91 They found that the presence of a political minority member on a three-judge federal appellate
court panel (that is, a Democratic appointee with two Republican appointees, or a Republican appointee with two Democratic appointees)
led to more consistent application of the Chevron USA. Inc v NRDC
doctrine in administrative law cases than when the panel was politically
unified (all Democratic or all Republican appointees). 3 Cass Sunstein
found that judges on like-minded panels appeared to vote far less moderately than judges on divided panels." Richard Revesz found similarly
in the environmental context.9 These results support the idea that
judges within panels may learn from one another's ideas and worldviews or otherwise act as a check on unwarranted discretion.
To the extent that reducing sentencing disparity remains a goal of
reform, we suggest that structural changes in judicial review hierarchychanges that acknowledge the political-ideological forces at work in
sentencing-be considered. In particular, we suggest institutionalizing
91 See Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanshipand Obedience to Legal
Doctrine:Whistleblowing on the FederalCourts of Appeals, 107 Yale L J 2155,2159 (1998) (arguing
that judges are less likely to make decisions based on political preferences when the panel is ideologically divided). See also Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa M. Ellman, IdeologicalVoting
on Federal Courts of Appeals, 90 Va L Rev 301, 319-25 (204) (finding evidence of ideological
dampening in decisionmaking when a judge sits with two judges of the opposite party).
92 467 US 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that "[w]hen a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers," and the intent of Congress as to the meaning of the
statute is not clear, the court must defer to the agency's construction if that construction "is
based on a permissible construction of the statute").
93 See Cross and Tiller, 107 Yale L J at 2168-73 (cited in note 91) (conducting an empirical
examination of all DC Circuit Court of Appeals cases between 1991 and 1995 that cited Chevron
and finding that mixed panels were almost twice as likely to defer to nonaligned agency interpretations as compared with unified panels).
94 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent 168-82 (Harvard 2003) (discussing panel
effects in cases involving affirmative action, sex discrimination, environmental regulation, liability of directors for corporate wrongdoing, and the Americans with Disabilities Act).
95 See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,83 Va
L Rev 1717,1719 (1997) (finding that, on the DC Circuit, judges vote ideologically in general, tend
to vote more ideologically when their decision is unlikely to be reviewed by the Supreme Court,
and vote in a manner that is heavily influenced by the composition of the panel in a given case).
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political diversity for every sentencing event by ensuring that for any
criminal sentencing the lower court and higher court not share a uniform political (partisan) orientation.
In practice, political diversity in sentencing could be achieved in a
variety of ways. First, the system could ensure that a three-judge circuit panel reviewing a district court's sentencing decision would have
no more than two judges sharing the same political orientation (that
is, no more than two Democratic appointees or two Republican appointees on a panel reviewing a sentencing decision). Consequently, at
least one circuit judge would have a political orientation different
from that of the sentencing judge, thereby eliminating politically uniform vertical alignment.6 In terms of implementation, this could be
achieved by a congressional statute mandating the diversity, or the
appellate courts could impose such a rule on themselves. In effect, this
would impose an ideological cap on the normal practice of random
assignment of circuit judges to panels-no more than two circuit
judges on a panel can share the same political orientation. If a Democratic (Republican) appointee was the sentencing judge, then at
least one, if not two, of the circuit judges assigned to the case would
come from a pool of Republican (Democratic) appointees. We would
expect the consequence to be less disparity in sentencing, to the extent
that such is due to ideological bia&9
A second possible mechanism would be to set up a separate appellate review court for criminal sentencing (possibly made up of current federal circuit judges brought together in an alternative forum)
and ensure that such court is politically diverse. Consideration of an
appellate court with specialized jurisdiction is not without precedent.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has specialized jurisdiction over
patent appeals from lower district courts. And Supreme Court justices,
legislators, and special commissions have, at times, called for a new
national court of appeals to handle intercircuit conflicts or other issues that would reduce the Supreme Court's caseload."8
96 In fact, one circuit panel judge with a different political orientation than the district
court judge may be enough to prevent sentencing disparity, because that judge can act as a whistleblower on the other two judges if they do not properly scrutinize the lower court's sentencing
decision. See Cross and Tiller, 107 Yale L J at 2173-74 (cited in note 91).
97 See Emerson H. Tiller and Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposalfor Improving American
Justice, 99 Colum L Rev 215, 215-16 (1999) (proposing politically diverse circuit court panels
more generally).
98 See, for example, Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary,69 ABA
J 442, 447 (1983) (proposing the creation of a "special, but temporary panel of the new United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit" with the sole duty of reviewing intercircuit
conflicts); Court Improvements Act of 1983 (CI Act), S 645,98th Cong, 1st Sess, in 129 Cong Rec
S 3402-03, 3410-11 (Mar 1, 1983) (proposing the creation of an "Intercircuit Tribunal of the
United States Courts of Appeals" situated between the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
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As far as the use of political ideology or partisan identifiers for
constructing the specialized reviewing court, the use of such devices to
ensure policy and decisional balance is not unique in our system of
government. Numerous independent regulatory commissions-such
as the Surface Transportation Board (formerly the Interstate Commerce Commission), the National Transportation and Safety Board,
the SEC, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-are designed to
limit partisan excess through the use of split partisan arrangements
Congress designed these agencies as quasi-judicial institutions to be
filled with experts, but with partisan checks to protect against ideological excess by one party. Most telling in this regard is the design of the
United States Sentencing Commission itself, which the law requires to
have seven voting members, no more than four of whom may be members of the same politicalparty."
Restructuring courts to minimize political-ideological bias is not
without its critics. Former DC Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Patricia
Wald claims that using political orientation as a control on panel
makeup would have the effect of making judges act more partisan in
their decisionmaking' In a sense, judges would become role players for
their partisan identification.01 While that is certainly possible, the political
diversity of the mixed panel should nonetheless offset the extremes of
either group. In other words, a highly partisan yet mixed panel is more
likely to sentence consistently than a less charged group of like-minded
partisans sitting together (unified panel) that arose randomly.
An additional criticism by Wald is that mandating political diversity on appellate panels is contrary to the notion of a judiciary free of
political constraints and might undermine the authority and independence of the judiciary."' However, the judiciary's lack of freedom
from politics and ideology is exactly what is exposed by this empirical
and presenting the remarks of Senator Dole, who argued that the tribunal would "relieve the
drastically increased workload of the Supreme Court"); CI Act, 129 Cong Rec at D 484 (June 29,
1983) (noting the subcommittee's approval of the bill); Federal Judicial Center, Report of the
Study Group on the Caseloadof the Supreme Court, 57 FRD 573,590-95 (1972) (recommending
a National Court of Appeals that would decide many conflicts between circuits); Commission on
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structureand Internal Procedures:Recommendations for Change, 67 FRD 195,208 (1975) (recommending the creation of a National Court of
Appeals to "increase the capacity of the federal judicial system for definitive adjudication of
issues of national law").
99 See 28 USC § 991(a).
100See Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 Colum L Rev 235,255 (1999)
(criticizing Tiller and Cross's proposed mandatory mixed panels as both unnecessary and likely
to be counterproductive).
101Id (arguing that Tiller and Cross's "proposal will turn conferences into a type of political
jousting match, where each side is required to wear the colors of its party sponsor and to defend
its name to the death").
102See id at 256-57.
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study, and exactly what our proposal is intended to alleviate. If the
judiciary truly was an independent, nonpolitical body in the way envisioned by the Constitution, then of course such a proposal would not
be necessary. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
We have framed this discussion as one of Republican appointees
versus Democratic appointees. This is a natural distinction and, given
the attention that appellate courts have received recently, a reasonable one. Of course, we have focused on what is merely a proxy for
judicial philosophy and attitudes toward punishment. Other characteristics, perhaps more palatable to policymakers, could also be considered. For example, previous prosecutorial or judicial experience may
also be indicators of judicial attitudes toward sentencing.
CONCLUSION

This Article is the first to unify theory and judge-specific data to
describe sentencing in a political and hierarchical framework. We combine judge-level data with actual sentencing data in a manner that directly tests propositions derived from positive political theory. In addition, we believe that the methodology employed is one that most scholars, policymakers, and judges can accept as theoretically and empirically
valid. The study enriches our understanding of criminal sentencing by
focusing on the procedural and doctrinal details of criminal sentencing
through which judges can exercise sentencing discretion in a biased, if
not strategic, manner. In addition, this Article explains how the role of
circuit courts will become more important in the face of Booker, in
which the Supreme Court declared the Guidelines to be advisory.
Our results directly support two reforms-one informational and
the other structural. The first relates to transparency in sentencing
data, in particular data on the identity of the sentencing judge, and
how such data could be useful in helping to identify the sources of
judicial sentencing disparity that would lead to the types of reform
necessary to eliminate such bias. The second reform is more powerful
and controversial-the requirement of political-ideological diversity
on judicial appellate panels reviewing criminal sentences (which
would ensure hierarchical political-ideological diversity between the
lower sentencing court and the higher court reviewing such decisions).
Specifically, all sentencing review should involve both Democratic and
Republican judicial appointees. This amounts to an engineering of the
political structure of the judiciary that most scholars, judges, and policymakers would quickly reject at first mention for practical and jurisprudential reasons. We argue, nonetheless, that the benefits would be
substantial and that such a proposal (or one that adopts its primary
tenet-recognition of the role that political-ideological diversity within
the judiciary can play) deserves serious attention.
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APPENDIX

The purpose of this Appendix is to test the robustness of the results presented in the main text to a number of different specifications.
In general, we find that the results are quite robust and compare favorably to our previous work. As in the Article, we explore five dependent variables: (1) change in offense level; (2) totalprison sentence;
(3) change in prison sentence from minimum base offense level;
(4) change in prison sentence from minimum final offense level; and
(5) judge-induced departures.
We present a number of different specifications to aid in interpretation of the data. The first specification is:
(1) Total Prison = a + fiDemocrat + e
The regression is run at the level of an individual offender. Democrat is simply an indicator variable that takes on the value one if
the sentencing judge was appointed by a Democratic president and
zero if appointed by a Republican. The coefficient of interest in Equation (1) is f, which merely measures the average difference in sentences between Republican and Democratic appointees. It does not
take account of offender or offense characteristics, which may vary
systematically across districts and, consequently, across judges. Next,
we run the following regression to determine whether offender and
offense characteristics can explain differences between Republican
and Democratic appointees:
(2) Total Prison = a + fDemocrat+ 6OffenderVars +
,OffenseVars + c
Offender variables are reported in the tables and are age of offender, age of offender squared, and indicator variables for female,
black, and Hispanic origin. ' Offense variables should attempt to control for position on the sentencing grid. We do so by using base offense
level, base offense level squared, base offense level's interaction with
criminal history category, and five dummies for criminal history category. This specification is quite flexible and should take good account
of the Guidelines' structure. Because drug trafficking offenses constitute nearly three-quarters of the sample, we also include an indicator
variable for whether the offense of conviction was drug trafficking. As
such, / now measures the difference between Republican and Democratic appointees conditional on offender and offense characteristics.
103 We employed a richer set of offender variables in our previous paper. We use fewer here
in order to preserve sample size because some are missing.
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Another important concern is whether systematic differences
across circuits could drive the results. For example, if the Ninth Circuit
were largely comprised of Democratic appointees and had a liberal
departure policy, these circuit effects may be reflected in the Democrat coefficient, f8, even though Republican appointees may behave
similarly to Democratic appointees in the Ninth Circuit. We next add
circuit dummies to the regressions:
(3) Total Prison = a + fiDemocrat + bOffenderVars +
,OffenseVars + yCircuit + E
Circuit is a matrix of eleven dummy variables.' Therefore, Equation (3) compares differences between Democratic appointees and
Republicans appointees within a circuit and conditional on offender
and offense characteristics.
An important innovation of the Sentencing Guidelines was the
creation of appellate review of criminal sentences. To examine the
influence of district and circuit court alignment, we separate our Democrat indicator into two new variables: Aligned Democrat and Unaligned Democrat.This mimics the specification of our previous work,
in which we simply had a dummy for whether the circuit was majority
Democratic-appointed, and then interacted it with the percentage of
the district court that was Democratic-appointed. In addition, we attempt a new specification that was not tractable previously: we test
the effect of changes in the overall political composition of the circuit
courts. We will discuss this approach in greater detail below.

104 There are twelve circuit courts, including the DC Circuit. In our previous work, we conditioned on district dummies. However, given the small sample of offenders available here and
the fact that only 389 judges are in the sample, it was generally not tractable to include 82 district
dummies. Doing so generally decreased the estimated effect of Democrat.
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A. Appendix Table 1: Change in Offense Level
Appendix Table 1 presents the results for change in offense level,
so the dependent variable is thus final calculated offense level minus
base offense level."' The results for Democrat are fairly weak across
the board. Model 1 demonstrates that Democratic appointees reduce
offense levels by -0.72 more than Republican appointees. This difference is significant at the 5 percent level. Model 2 controls for offender
and offense variables, but the coefficient on Democrat is reduced to
-0.39, and is significant at only the 10 percent level. Adding circuit
dummies in Model 3 further reduces the magnitude of the coefficient
to -0.31. Given the weakness of these initial results, it is not surprising
that we get even less precise results when we separate Democrat into
Aligned Democratand Unaligned Democratgroups in Model 4.
Despite their weakness, these results compare favorably to our
previous work, which found that an all-Democratic bench would reduce offense-level calculations for serious offenses by about 0.5 offense levels. We found no evidence of circuit alignment effects. The
coefficients reported here suggest that there may be an alignment effect, but the standard errors are too large to suggest a difference.

105 Regressions taking final offense level as the dependent variable did not yield any significant results.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
CHANGE IN OFFENSE LEVEL
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

-0.72*
(0.34)

-0.39+
(0.22)

-0.31
(0.21)

Model 4

Judge variables
Democrat
Aligned Democrat

-0.44
(0.31)

Unaligned Democrat

-0.20
(0.28)

Offender variables
Drug offense

-3.11**
(0.22)

-3.00**
(0.38)

-3.00**
(0.38)

Age

-0.03
(0.07)

-0.05
(0.06)

-0.05
(0.06)

Age sq

0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

Female

-0.84"*
(0.29)

-0.80**
(0.28)

-0.80**
(0.27)

-0.11
(0.24)

-0.12
(0.24)

-0.11
(0.24)

-0.82**
(0.22)

-0.65**
(0.22)

-0.65**
(0.22)

-0.38
(0.22)
No
Yes
0.21
1,225

6.45**
(1.68)
Yes
Yes
0.33
1,225

6.44
(1.69)
Yes
Yes
0.33
1,225

Black
Hispanic
Constant
Circuit dummies
Grid controls
R-squared
Observations

-1.31**
(0.25)
No
No
0.01
1,241

Standard errors are robust and reflect clustering by judge.
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.
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Appendix Table 2: Total Prison Sentence in Months

Appendix Table 2 presents the results taking totalprison sentence
as the dependent variable. We include all prison sentences less than
990 months in the initial regressions' and then remove substantial
assistance cases. The first three columns provide very weak evidence
of partisan differences, although the estimate of the coefficient on
Democrat of roughly -6 in Models 1 and 2 compares quite favorably to
our previous work. Removing substantial assistance cases in Model 4
creates a clearer picture: Democratic appointees impose 6.7-monthlower sentences relative to Republican appointees, and the difference
is significant at the 5 percent level. This is nearly identical to our previous results of six- to seven-month-lower prison sentences when the
district is entirely Democratic-appointed. Separating Democratic appointees into aligned and unaligned circuits in Column (5) does not
present a clear picture of circuit court influence.

106 Prison sentences of 990 months represent significant outliers. There were two 990-month
sentences, and the next highest sentences were 572 months and 346 months. There was one life
sentence, which we also excluded.
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
TOTAL PRISON SENTENCE IN MONTHS
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-6.54
(6.40)

-6.14+
(3.52)

-3.12
(2.69)

-6.65*
(3.12)

Model 5

Judge variables
Democrat
Aligned
Democrat

-7.76
(5.29)

Unaligned
Democrat

-5.75
(3.16)

Offender variables
Drug offense

-26.5**
(4.30)

-27.7**
(12.08)

-24.7**
(4.30)

-24.6**
(4.28)

Age

0.39
(1.26)

-0.28
(0.99)

-0.20
(1.21)

-0.23
(1.26)

Age sq

-0.003
(0.02)

Female

-13.7**
(3.57)
6.24
(4.32)

0.01
(0.01)
-12.9**
(2.96)

0.006
(0.02)
-11.2**
(3.41)

0.006
(0.02)
-11.2**
(3.40)

5.78
(3.59)

5.65
(4.24)

5.73
(4.30)

0.81
(2.59)

-0.13
(3.14)

-0.21
(3.39)

79.7**
(5.31)

-5.52
(3.43)
34.4
(21.6)

41.4
(16.7)

39.0
(20.4)

38.5
(20.4)

No
No

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

0.01
1,254

0.41
1,212

0.43
1,212

Black
Hispanic
Constant
Circuit dummies
Grid controls
Substantial
assistance cases
R-squared
Observations

Standard errors are robust and reflect clustering by judge.
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.

The University of Chicago Law Review

C.

[75:715

Appendix Table 3: Change in Prison Sentence from Minimum of
Base Range

The best way to study the full effect of adjustments is to examine
changes in prison sentences that result from that type of manipulation.
Appendix Table 3 presents this specification, although we limit cases
to those that did not involve a departure, so that we may focus on
changes that were exclusively the result of offense-level manipulations. The dependent variable is the difference between the minimum
prison sentence in the base sentencing range and the final prison sentence. Including departures tends to make the results stronger but
confounds the alignment analysis, because we predict that departures
will be more likely in aligned circuits. We want to focus the alignment
analysis on cases that relied only on departures.
The results are similar across the first three specifications, and are
actually the most significant when we include the full set of controls in
Model 3. Democratic appointees reduce base sentences by 6.5 to 8
months relative to Republican appointees. There were a fair number
of outliers in the data, and a concern with OLS is that outliers (particularly in small samples) could be responsible for the results. In
Model 4, we eliminated observations in which the final sentence was
more than one hundred months away from the base sentence, removing forty-three observations. The coefficient on Democrat shrank to -4
months but remained significant at the 10 percent level.
Models 5 and 6 separate Democrat into aligned and unaligned circuits. An "aligned circuit" is 50 percent or more Democratic-appointed,
and an "unaligned circuit" is less than 50 percent Democraticappointed. Model 5 includes offender and offense controls but not
circuit dummies, while Model 6 adds circuit dummies. Both columns
suggest that there is little difference between aligned and unaligned
Democratic appointees. In fact, in Model 6 the coefficient on Unaligned Democrat is actually larger than the coefficient on Aligned
Democrat and is independently significant. These results again conform nicely to our previous work, which failed to find any alignment
effects for changes in base offense levels
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APPENDIX TABLE 3
CHANGE IN PRISON SENTENCE FROM MINIMUM OF BASE RANGE
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

-8.07+
(4.49)

-6.56+
(3.71)

-7.22*
(3.40)

Model 4
Model 5
(no outliers)

Model 6

Judge
variables
Democrat

-4.08+
(2.25)

Aligned
Democrat

-7.32
(4.46)

-5.49
(6.19)

Unaligned
Democrat

-6.06
(4.27)

-8.32**
(3.88)

Offender
variables
Drug
offense
Age

-24.26**
(4.89)
-0.39
(1.64)
0.01
(0.02)

-23.08**
(4.72)
-0.76
(1.63)
0.02
(0.02)

-24.26**
(4.89)
-0.25
(0.65)
0.003
(0.01)

-24.23**
(4.86)
-0.41
(1.65)
0.011
(0.02)

-23.08**
(4.72)
-0.73
(0.99)
0.017
(0.02)

-10.23*
(4.00)
1.72
(4.72)
-5.12
(3.73)
-22.16
(26.80)

-7.76**
(2.19)
1.49
(2.74)
-2.28
(2.86)
7.21
(13.39)

-10.17**
(3.82)
1.47
(4.84)
-9.99**
(3.70)
-17.09*
(29.37)

-10.12**
(4.00)

0.21
(3.58)

-10.11"
(3.84)
1.50
(4.88)
-9.93*
(3.71)
-17.61
(29.17)

Circuit
dumie
dummies

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Grid
crd
controls

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Age sq
Female
Black
Hispanic
Constant

1.67
(4.74)
-5.02
(3.70)
-22.26*
(26.77)

NonNonNonNonNonNondepartures departures departures departures departures departures
R-squared
0.01
0.24
0.33
0.33
0.27
0.27
Observations
762
732
732
689
732
732
Standard errors are robust and reflect clustering by judge.
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.
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Appendix Table 4: Change in Prison Sentence from Minimum of
Final Range

Theory predicts that district court judges inclined to give lower
sentences should make greater use of departures when they face a
sympathetic appellate body. The first three columns of Appendix Table 4 simply test differences between Republican and Democratic appointees. We find that Democratic appointees depart to a greater extent than Republican appointees (by roughly five to seven months).
This is in contrast to our previous finding that there were no partisan
differences in departure magnitudes unless we considered circuit
alignment. There is an easy explanation for this difference, however,
because the present study covers a much more recent timeframe, during which circuits are relatively more Democratic. Strong evidence for
this position is found in the next few columns.
Models 4 and 5 both indicate that the Democratic appointees in
Democratic-majority circuits grant departures on average twice as
large as Democratic appointees in Republican circuits. In other words,
the coefficient on Democrat in Models 1 through 3 comes almost entirely from Democratic appointees in Democratic circuits. Given the
fairly large standard deviations, we cannot say as a statistical matter
that the coefficient on Aligned Democrat is larger than the coefficient
on Unaligned Democrat. Given the sample size, however, the results
are as suggestive as can be hoped. Most importantly, they again conform well to our previous findings that Democratic appointees in
aligned circuits gave 3- to 5.5-months-lower sentences relative to Democratic appointees in Republican circuits.
Models 6 and 7 employ a more flexible specification for circuit
court politics: the percentage of Democratic appointees on the active
circuit court bench. The variable %Circuit Dem is added to the regression and interacted with Democrat.The signs of the ideology variables
are, as expected, negative. The coefficient on Democrat is a small -1
month, implying that, without alignment, there is little difference between Democratic appointees and Republican appointees on departure magnitude. The %Circuit Dem and Democrat coefficients are
both negative and similar in magnitude, but are not independently
significant. Their joint significance was 0.001, which is consistent with
the strong alignment effects observed previously. Model 7 adds circuit
dummies, and we remove the %Circuit Dem because there was so
little variation in our timeframe.
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APPENDIX TABLE 4
CHANGE IN PRISON SENTENCE FROM MINIMUM OF FINAL RANGE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Judge variables
Democrat

-6.88**
(2.44)

-1.03
(5.73)

-5.47** -6.02**
(2.27)
(2.40)

Aligned
Democrat

-7.81*
(3.13)

-8.50**
(3.02)

Unaligned
Democrat

-3.40
(2.42)

-4.03+
(2.65)

-3.10
(5.73)

-9.49
(10.38)

%Circuit Dem
Dem *
%Circuit Dem

-8.00
(12.29)

-5.68
(11.29)

Offender variables
-8.21**
(2.06)
0.10
(1.01)
-0.001
(0.02)

-7.64** -8.64**
(3.02)
(2.79)
0.31
-0.22
(1.03)
(1.03)
-0.004
0.004
(0.01)
(0.02)

-7.40**
(2.82)

-8.90**
(3.03)

-8.90**
(3.03)

-0.27
(1.02)
0.005
(0.02)

-0.01
(1.01)
0.001
(0.02)

0.17
(0.73)
-0.002
(0.01)

Female

-8.21**
(2.06)

-6.92**
(1.92)

-9.37**
(1.96)

-6.96**
(1.90)

-8.13**
(1.96)

-6.28**
(2.03)

Black

3.55
(3.07)

3.03
(2.75)

3.07
(3.09)

3.21
(2.81)

3.20
(3.08)

7.93*
(3.03)

Hispanic

-1.88
(2.42)

0.82
(2.32)

-2.71
(2.46)

0.66
(2.19)

-1.82
(2.43)

0.48
(2.55)

6.33**
(1.94)
No
No
0.01

-16.42
(16.50)
No
Yes
0.06

-21.62
(16.37)
Yes
Yes
0.21

-23.75+
(12.72)
No
Yes
0.06

-29.60*
(13.47)
Yes
Yes
0.21

-9.97
(17.50)
No
Yes
0.06

-29.65*
(13.67)
Yes
Yes
0.06

936

887

887

887

887

887

887

Drug offense
Age
Age sq

Constant
Circuit dummies
Grid controls
R-squared
Observations

Standard errors are robust and reflect clustering by judge.
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.
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Appendix Table 5: Probability of Judge-induced
Downward Departures

Appendix Table 5 presents probit regression results, in which the
dependent variable equals one if the judge chooses to depart downward (substantial assistance departures are excluded from the sample). Thus, Appendix Table 4 measures the degree of departure, while
Appendix Table 5 measures the probability of a departure. The two
tables mesh very nicely, with likelihood of departures being greater
when the judge is an aligned Democratic appointee and no greater
otherwise. Again, in Columns (4) and (5), the proportion of the reviewing court that is Democratic-appointed, while not statistically significant, is positively correlated with the probability of downward departures. These results are actually stronger than those of our earlier
work, which failed to find statistically significant ideological effects on
sentencing (although the signs in general were, as expected, positive).
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APPENDIX TABLE 5
PROBABILITY OF JUDGE-INDUCED DOWNWARD DEPARTURES
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

-0.077
(0.096)

-0.039
(0.086)

Judge variables
Democrat
Aligned
Democrat

0.17**
(0.052)

0.15"*
(0.047)

0.088*
(0.044)

Unaligned
Democrat

-0.044
(0.029)

-0.067*
(0.031)

-0.021
(0.034)

%Circuit Dem

0.30
(0.17)

Dem *
%Circuit Dem

0.22
(0.18)

0.14
(0.16)

Offender variables
Drug offense

0.022
(0.035)

0.004
(0.033)

0.004
(0.033)

0.006
(0.032)

Age

-0.013*
(0.006)

-0.009
(0.006)

-0.009
(0.006)

-0.010
(0.006)

Age sq * 100

0.02*
(0.009)

0.012
(0.009)

0.012
(0.009)

0.014
(0.008)

Female

0.15"*
(0.055)
-0.087**
(0.029)
0.031
(0.034)
No
Yes
899

0.16**
(0.057)
-0.043
(0.027)
-0.0019
(0.034)
Yes
Yes
899

0.16**
(0.057)

0.16**
(0.056)

-0.043
(0.027)
-0.0019
(0.034)
No
Yes
899

-0.040
(0.034)
-0.0039
(0.034)
Yes
Yes
899

Black
Hispanic
Circuit dummies
Grid controls
Observations

No
Yes
921

The estimates are probit regressions in which the dependent variable equals one in the event of a judge-induced
departure. Marginal effects are reported (so the probability of receiving a downward departure is 8.8 percentage
points greater for an aligned Democrat than for a Republican or unaligned Democrat). Standard errors are
robust and reflect clustering by judge.
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1
SENTENCING TABLE (IN MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT)
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